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Money Laundering Trends in South Africa 
Louis de Koker 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although money laundering has been a statutory offence for close on ten years in 
South Africa1, not much is known about the phenomenon of laundering in the 
country. In particular, little is known about the methods that South African 
criminals employ to launder their ill-gotten gains. 
This Centre for the Study of Economic Crime (CenSEC) of RAU University 
undertook a limited study to identify major laundering trends in South Africa. It 
was the first study of its kind to be undertaken in South Africa. As a result, it 
posed a number of challenges. Classic empirical research in this field is diffcult, if 
not impossible, because the activity is inherently secretive in nature. The 
suspicious transactions reports that have been filed with the South African Police 
Service since 19972 are still too few and too unrepresentative to use as a basis 
for such a study. As a result, it was decided to consult experts in law enforcement 
and in business on the knowledge and impressions gained from criminal and 
compliance investigations and to base the study on their perceptions and 
impressions. To ensure that the views reflected in this study are representative of 
trends in South Africa in general, the experts were invited to a workshop where 
their views could be aired and debated and where consensus could be reached. 
The workshop took place at the RAU University on 5th December, 2001. It 
was hosted and facilitated by CenSEC and was supported by the National 
Treasury, the Money Laundering Forum of South Africa, the Compliance Institute 
of South Africa and Monash University (South Africa). The workshop was 
primarily funded by the British High Commission in South Africa. It was attended 
by a group of persons who represented 440 years of experience in combating 
financial crime in South Africa. In essence,3 the report was based on the 
consensus reached during that workshop. The report itself was released in March 
2002 and it is available on the website of the CenSEC.4 This article presents the 
findings of the study. 
 
THE LAW 
Introduction 
The term `money laundering' in South African criminal law currently5 refers to a 
number of different offences that can be committed in terms of the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (POCA).6 The concept also overlaps with 
certain common law offences (for instance fraud, forgery and uttering) and 
statutory offences (for instance corruption). Internationally, there is a fair measure 
of similarity and conformity amongst the different national laws that give rise to 
money laundering offences. This conformity can be ascribed to the influence of 
international instruments that create duties regarding the criminalisation of money 
laundering,7 the 40 Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the 
influence of the Task Force, the Commonwealth and other international role 
players in this field. However, the South African laundering offences are wider in 
ambit than similar offences that are generally encountered internationally. It is 
therefore important to provide an overview of the relevant criminal provisions in 
South African law before the trends can be discussed. 
 
The relevant laws 
Although intentional launderers have been prosecuted successfully in terms of 
South African common law as accessories after the fact,8 South Africa 
supplemented its law in this regard with statutory provisions in the Drugs and 
Drug Trafficking Act 140 of 1992. This Act criminalised, inter alia, the laundering 
of the proceeds of specific drug- related offences and required the reporting of 
suspicious transactions involving the proceeds of drug-related offences. The 
Proceeds of Crime Act 76 of 1996 broadened the scope of the statutory 
laundering provisions to all types of offences. In 1999, the Proceeds of Crime Act 
as well as the laundering provisions of the Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act were 
repealed when POCA came into effect. 
 
POCA: 
 
(i) criminalises racketeering and creates offences relating to    
activities of criminal gangs; 
 
(ii) criminalises money laundering in general and also creates a 
number of serious offences in respect of laundering and 
racketeering; 
 
(iii) contains a general reporting obligation for businesses coming 
into possession of suspicious property;9 and 
 
(iv) contains mechanisms for criminal confiscation of proceeds of 
crime and for civil forfeiture of proceeds and instrumentalities 
of offences. 
 
 
POCA creates two sets of money laundering offences:10 
 
(i) offences involving proceeds of all forms of crime; and 
 
(ii) offences involving proceeds of a pattern of racketeering. 
 
 
General money laundering provisions  
 
Important definitions 
The general money laundering provisions criminalise certain acts in respect of 
the `proceeds of unlawful activities'. This phrase is defined in s. 1 of POCA as 
any property or any service, advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, 
received or retained in connection with or as a result of any unlawful activity 
carried on by any person. In addition, the definition makes it clear that the 
proceeds could have been derived, directly or indirectly, in South Africa or 
elsewhere, at any time before or after the commencement of POCA11 and that it 
includes any property representing such property.  
`Property' is defined broadly as money or any other movable, immovable, 
corporeal or incorporeal thing. It also includes any rights, privileges, claims, 
securities and any interest in, and all proceeds of, such property.12 `Unlawful 
activity' is any conduct which constitutes a crime or which contravenes any law 
irrespective of whether or not such conduct occurred before or after the 
commencement of POCA and whether it occurred in South Africa or elsewhere.13 
 
General offences 
POCA creates three main general money laundering offences. First, a person 
who knows or ought reasonably to have known that property is or forms part of 
the proceeds of unlawful activities, commits an offence in terms of s. 4 if he 
enters into any agreement, arrangement or transaction (whether legally 
enforceable or not) in connection with the property; or performs any other act in 
connection with the property, which has the effect or is likely to have the effect: 
(i) of concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, 
disposition or movement of the property or the ownership of 
the property or any interest in the property; or 
 
(ii) of enabling or assisting any person who committed an offence 
to avoid prosecution or to remove or diminish any property 
acquired as a result of an offence. 
 
 
Second, a person commits an offence in terms of s. 5 if he knows or ought 
reasonably to have known that another person has obtained the proceeds of 
unlawful activities and enters into any transaction, agreement or arrangement in 
terms of which: 
 
(i) the retention or control by or on behalf of that other person of 
the proceeds of unlawful activity is facilitated; or 
 
 
(ii) the proceeds are used to make funds available to that person, 
to acquire property on his behalf, or to benefit him in any 
other way. 
 
Third, a person who acquires, uses or possesses property and who knows or 
ought reasonably to have known that it is or forms part of the proceeds of 
unlawful activities of another person, commits an offence under s. 6. 
 
Negligence and intent 
The offences under ss 4, 5 and 6 can only be committed by a person who knows 
or ought reasonably to have known that the property concerned constituted the 
proceeds of unlawful activities. 
For purposes of the Act, a person had knowledge of a fact if he actually knew that 
fact, or if the court is satisfied that he believed that there was a reasonable 
possibility of the existence of that fact and then failed to obtain information to 
confirm or disprove the fact.14 A person acts negligently if he fails to recognise or 
suspect a fact which a person with the general knowledge, skill, training and 
experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the position of the 
particular person as well as the general knowledge, skill, training and experience 
that he or she in fact has, would have recognised or suspected.15 
 
Defence and penalties 
A person who is charged with negligently committing an offence under ss 2 (1)(a) 
or (b) or 4, 5, or 6 may raise the fact that he reported a suspicion under s. 7 of 
POCA as a defence.16 
A person who is convicted of a money laundering offence under ss 4, 5 or 
6 is liable to a maximum fine of R100m (US$9m) or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 30 years.17 
 
Money laundering and racketeering 
The racketeering provisions of POCA are contained in chapter 2 of the Act.18 
This chapter creates inter alia a number of offences in connection with the 
receipt, use or investment of proceeds of a `pattern of racketeering activity'. 
The Act does not define `racketeering' but does provide a definition of a 
`pattern of racketeering activity'. This phrase refers to the planned, ongoing, 
continuous or repeated participation or involvement in any offence referred to in 
Schedule 1 of POCA. Schedule 1 contains a list of offences such as murder, 
rape, corruption, fraud, perjury, theft and robbery, as well as any offence 
punishable with imprisonment of more than one year without the option of a fine. 
In terms of the definition, a pattern is established when at least two of these listed 
offences were committed, if: 
 
(i) the latter occurred within ten years of the commission of the 
prior offence (excluding any period of imprisonment); and 
 
(ii) at least one of the offences was committed after the 
commencement of the Act. 
 
 
The laundering offences in terms of chapter 2 are committed when the proceeds 
of a pattern of racketeering activity are invested in or on behalf of an `enterprise'. 
`Enterprise' is defined as including any individual, partnership, corporation, 
association or other juristic person or legal entity and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact, although not a juristic person or legal entity.19 
 
Laundering offences linked to racketeering 
The following acts in connection with property constitute offences if the person 
knows or ought reasonably to have known20 that the property is derived, directly 
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity. These offences are 
committed irrespective of whether or not the acts occur in 
South Africa or elsewhere. 
First, an offence is committed in terms of s. 2(1)(a) if such property is 
received or retained and any part of it is used or invested, directly or indirectly, to 
acquire any interest in an enterprise, to establish or operate an enterprise or to 
fund any activities of an enterprise. 
Second, an offence is committed in terms of s. 2(1) (b) if a person receives 
or retains any such property, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an enterprise. 
Third, an offence is committed under s. 2(1) (c) if a person uses or invests 
any such property, directly or indirectly, on behalf of any enterprise, to acquire an 
interest in an enterprise, to establish or operate an enterprise or to fund the 
activities of an enterprise. 
The offences in s. 2(1) (c) are very similar to the offences in terms of s. 
2(1) (a). However, s. 2(1) (c) does not explicitly require that the offender received 
or retained any tainted property before an offence can be committed.21 Any 
person who conspires or attempts to commit any of the s. 2(1) offences commits 
an offence in terms of s. 2(1) (g). A person convicted of a racketeering offence in 
terms of s. 2(1) is liable to a fine not exceeding R1,000m (US$90m) or to 
imprisonment for a maximum term of life imprisonment. 
 
Reporting of suspicious transactions 
General reporting obligations in respect of suspicious transactions are created by 
s. 7 of POCA. This section will be repealed by FICA and replaced with a new and 
broader provision relating to suspicious and unusual transactions. However, as 
the relevant provisions of FICA have not yet taken effect, the following discussion 
focuses on the current obligations under s. 7. 
 
General reporting obligations 
A person who carries on a business, is in charge of a business undertaking, 
manages a business undertaking, or is employed by a business undertaking, and 
who has reason to suspect:  
 
(i) that any property which comes into his possession or the 
possession of the business undertaking is or forms part of the 
proceeds of unlawful activities; or 
 
(ii) that a transaction to which he or the business undertaking is a 
party will facilitate the transfer of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities, must report this suspicion as well as all information 
concerning the grounds for the suspicion to the Commander 
of the Commercial Crime Investigations Subcomponent of the 
South African Police Service within a reasonable time.22 
 
(iii) A person who is party to a transaction in respect of which he 
forms a suspicion and which, in his opinion, should be 
reported under s. 7, may continue with that transaction but 
must ensure that all records relating to such transaction are 
kept and that all reasonable steps are taken to discharge the 
reporting obligation.23 
 
 
Secrecy and confidentiality 
In general, no obligation as to secrecy or any other restriction on the disclosure of 
information in respect of the affairs or business of another, whether imposed by 
any law, the common law or any agreement, affects this duty to report or to 
permit access to any register, record or other document.24 The reporter is 
explicitly exonerated from liability for any breach of secrecy that occurs as a 
result of the disclosure of information in compliance with this reporting 
obligation.25 
Section 7 recognises only one exemption from the general reporting 
obligation, namely the attorney-client privilege in a criminal defence context. 
Section 7(5) (a) stipulates that the reporting duty may not be construed so as to 
infringe upon the common law right to professional privilege between an attorney 
and his client in respect of information communicated to the attorney to enable 
him to provide advice, defend or render other legal assistance to the client in 
connection with an offence under any law: 
 
(i) of which the client is charged; 
 
(ii) for which he has been arrested or summoned to appear in 
court; or 
 
(iii) in respect of which an investigation is being conducted 
against him with a view to instituting criminal proceedings.26 
 
 
 
Penalty 
Failure to comply with the reporting obligation constitutes an offence for which a 
person is liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years. 
A person who lodged a report may raise that fact as a defence if he or she is 
charged with negligently committing a money laundering offence under ss 2(1) 
(a) or (b) or 4, 5 or 6.27 
 
Tipping-off 
Once a report has been made under s. 7, care should be taken that information 
prejudicial to an investigation does not leak. A person who knows or ought 
reasonably to have known that information has been disclosed in terms of s. 7, or 
that an investigation is being or may be conducted as a result of such a 
disclosure, commits an offence under s. 75(1) if he directly or indirectly alerts 
another person, or brings information to the attention of another person, which 
will or is likely to prejudice such an investigation. The penalty for this offence is a 
fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years. 
 
Reporting statistics 
According to the reporting statistics released by the Commercial Branch of the 
South African Police Service 2585 reports were ®led since June 1997 until 
February 2002 (see Annex A). A number of these reports have resulted in 
convictions and/or asset forfeiture. The successes that flowed from suspicious 
transaction reports were not formally recorded, but the Commercial Branch Head 
Once has information regarding the value and positive impact of these reports. A 
Proceeds of Crime Investigation Desk was established at the Commercial Branch 
Head Office on 1st January, 2002. The Desk will receive, evaluate, analyse and 
distribute the suspicious transactions reports and other relevant information that 
is sent to the Commercial Branch. The Desk is set to increase the effective 
processing and investigation of laundering reports, information and intelligence 
by the South African Police Service. The Desk will also assist in keeping statistics 
on the use of information derived from suspicious transaction reports.28 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
(FICA) 
Apart from reporting obligations, POCA does not impose the detailed compliance 
obligations that are generally associated with a money laundering control system. 
These obligations are created by FICA which: 
 
(i) provides for the establishment and operation of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre (FIC) and a Money Laundering Advisory 
Council (MLAC); 
 
(ii) creates money laundering control obligations for specific 
persons and institutions;29 and 
 
(iii) regulates access to specific information. 
 
In terms of Notice 6 of 2002,30 the following provisions of FICA came into 
operation on 1st February, 2002: 
 
(i) s. 1 (defnitions); 
 
(ii) chapter 1: ss 2±16 (FIC); 
 
(iii) chapter 2: ss 17±20 (MLAC); and 
 
(iv)  chapter 5: ss 72±82 (miscellaneous), except s. 79 
(amendment of laws). 
 
The effect of the proclamation is that the FIC and the MLAC were both 
established on 1st February, 2002. In addition, the Minister has been empowered 
to make regulations to provide guidance on all matters that must be prescribed by 
regulation in terms of FICA. Further provisions of FICA, including the money 
laundering control obligations, will come into effect when the regulations are 
made. Until the relevant provisions come into effect, POCA remains the only 
statute creating specific money laundering offences. As this report focuses on the 
laundering offences that can be committed under South African law at the date of 
this report, no further discussion of FICA is required.31 
 
The law and money laundering trends 
As set out in the discussion above, the South African money laundering offences 
have a broad scope: first, the relevant offences can be committed either 
intentionally or negligently; secondly, the offences are not confined to the 
proceeds of drug-related or serious offences, but can be committed in respect of 
the proceeds of any type of offence, whether committed in South Africa or 
elsewhere and whether committed before or after the commencement of POCA; 
thirdly, although the majority of offences can only be committed by third parties 
who facilitate the laundering of the proceeds of another, the main laundering 
offences can be committed by the criminal who committed the underlying offence 
32 – every act that the criminal commits in an attempt to hide, change or spend the 
proceeds can therefore constitute a laundering offence; fourth, no minimum value 
is required to be involved in a laundering transaction before an offence can be 
committed. 
One consequence of the broad definition of laundering in POCA is that 
virtually every act that a criminal or a third party commits in respect of the 
proceeds of crime can constitute a laundering offence. A study of laundering 
trends from a South African perspective is therefore not confined to those acts 
that are committed with the intention to launder the funds but extends, in 
principle, to every act that is committed in respect of the proceeds of unlawful 
activities. However, such acts will only constitute laundering offences, if it can be 
proved that they were committed intentionally or by a person who negligently 
failed to appreciate the true nature of the property concerned. 
 
MONEY LAUNDERING TRENDS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
During the workshop, participants listed examples of money laundering schemes 
that they generally encounter. These examples were grouped and were then 
analysed in smaller group discussions. The following five broad themes emerged 
from these discussions: 
(i) purchase of goods and properties; 
 
(ii) abuse of businesses and business entities; 
 
(iii) cash and currency; 
 
(iv) abuse of financial institutions; and 
 
(v) the informal sector of the economy. 
 
Purchase of goods and properties 
South African criminals appear to enjoy the wealth that they derive from crime.33 
Instead of hiding the wealth, it is often displayed. Money is spent on expensive 
clothes, personal effects, vehicles, property and furniture. In coastal areas boats, 
jet skis and yachts are also purchased by some criminals and in rural areas 
livestock and farm implements are bought.34 These purchases are not necessarily 
made with the intention to launder money. In the majority of cases criminals 
merely want to enjoy the proceeds of their crimes and improve their lifestyles.35 
However, in view of the broad definition of laundering in South African law, these 
transactions would still constitute laundering offences as defined in POCA.36 
Criminals purchase the above-mentioned goods from ordinary vendors (for 
instance, general retailers, private citizens who are selling second-hand goods, 
auctioneers etc). The fact that sizeable cash transactions are often concluded in 
South Africa facilitates cash purchases by criminals. 
As sizeable amounts of dirty money are used to buy vehicles and real estate, 
special attention was given to these transactions during the workshop. 
 
Vehicles 
Many vehicle dealers are not yet aware of their duty under POCA to report 
suspicious transactions. As a result, it is still fairly easy for criminals to purchase 
vehicles for cash without a fear of triggering a suspicious transaction report. 
These vehicles will often be luxury vehicles, but cases have also been 
encountered where smaller vehicles and commercial vehicles were purchased by 
criminals.  
Some of these vehicles are registered in the names of the criminals, but 
sophisticated criminals who are concerned about the risks of confiscation and 
forfeiture of their assets often register the vehicle in the name of a front company, 
a family member or a close friend.37 
 
Real estate 
Criminals often spend money on real estate. Although these criminals would 
often buy residential properties in up-market suburbs, cases have been identified 
where ordinary residential property, commercial property and farms were bought. 
In some cases the criminals deliberately bought run-down properties because it 
gave them the opportunity to spend sizeable amounts of cash to restore the 
property. Instances were also detected where the criminal assembled a portfolio 
of properties that were let to tenants who would often pay the rental in cash. This 
real estate rental business then served as a front that enabled the criminal to 
launder proceeds from other offences. 
Estate agents are not yet fully compliant with their obligations under 
POCA. As a result, appropriate questions are not generally asked when a client 
proposes to settle the purchase price in cash.38  
As in the case of vehicles, the properties are sometimes registered in the 
name of the criminal but more often in the names of corporate entities or trusts 
con- trolled by the criminal or in the names of family members of third parties.39 
Real estate transactions are also abused in another way to launder money: 
proceeds of crime are paid into a trust account40 of an attorney or an estate agent 
by a new client who instructs the attorney or agent to assist him in acquiring a 
property. A few days later the client cancels the instructions and requests the 
repayment of the money. The money will often be repaid by means of a cheque 
drawn by the attorney or the estate agent. In these cases the criminal uses the 
ruse of a transaction to launder a sizeable amount of money through the trust 
account of the attorney or estate agent. 
 
Financing of purchases 
Although vehicles are often bought for cash and real estate transactions are 
sometimes settled in cash, cases have also been encountered where the criminal 
obtained financing for the transaction from a financial institution. The proceeds of 
crime are then used to settle the hire purchase obligations or to pay o  the bond 
in a short period. In certain cases, the payments continue after all the obligations 
to the financial institution were met. As a result a surplus amount builds up in the 
particular account. Such amounts can escape detection by law enforcement 
authorities. 
 
Location of property 
It seems as if criminals prefer to buy real estate in South Africa rather than to 
invest in properties abroad. According to the experts, the vast majority of 
movable property which is bought (for instance, vehicles, boats, aircraft and 
yachts) also remains within South African territory. This trend could perhaps be 
ascribed to the weak exchange rate and to the fact that criminals wish to enjoy 
their wealth and therefore want their purchases to be close by. How- ever, it is 
also possible that substantial international purchases and investments have 
escaped detection by law enforcement offcials. Such transactions would 
deliberately be masked or disguised where they are made in contravention of the 
South African exchange control regulations. 
 
Abuse of businesses and business entities 
Criminals often use business activities and business enterprises to launder 
money. Such business activities are conducted in the formal and informal sectors 
of the South African economy. These business enter- prises can be 
unincorporated (for instance sole proprietorships, business trusts and 
partnerships) or incorporated (for instance close corporations and companies). 
Shell corporations are sometimes used to open and operate bank accounts. 
These entities will not actually be trading and their main purposes would be to 
provide the criminal with a corporate cloak under which he could hide his identity 
and launder money. These entities could be registered personally or through an 
agent, such as an auditor or attorney, or be bought off the shelf. Shelf companies 
are advertised for as little as R650 and shelf corporations for only R450.The 
shareholders, directors or members of these shell corporations are often family 
members of other third parties who will act according to the instructions of the 
ultimate controller of the corporation. 
Front businesses often feature in laundering schemes. Unlike shell 
corporations, these businesses are trading actively. The proceeds of crime are 
used to fund the business activities of the enterprise and/ or are simply co-
mingled with the legitimate proceeds of the business itself and deposited into the 
bank account of the business as the proceeds of the business. If the criminal 
launders cash, the front business will normally be cash-based to facilitate the 
process. Examples of such businesses that have been encountered in South 
Africa include bars, restaurants, shebeens, cash loans businesses and cellphone 
shops. Businesses that import and export goods into and from South Africa are 
also often abused in laundering schemes. Their business activities can be used 
to shield over- and under-invoicing schemes, thereby allowing a criminal to move 
criminal funds across the borders of South Africa. Many South African criminals 
mastered the art of such schemes during the periods of strict exchange controls 
in the 1970s and 1980s. These skills are still employed to evade the current 
exchange controls but, in addition, are also employed in the commission of 
import/export frauds and in laundering schemes. 
The trust appears to be particularly vulnerable to abuse in laundering 
schemes. Although the South African trust affords participants the benefit of 
privacy and limited liability,41 it is not closely regulated and the public record 
system in respect of trusts is also deficient. As a result, trusts often feature in 
laundering schemes and schemes to hide assets that may be subject to 
confiscation or forfeiture procedures.42 Apart from South African trusts, schemes 
involving offshore trusts have also been encountered by investigators. 
 
Cash and currency 
Criminals who commit offences that generate cash proceeds, for instance cash 
heists or drug trafficking, are often able to transfer or spend substantial amounts 
without using the formal financial system.  
Evidence has been found that substantial amounts are transferred 
physically to and from destinations in South Africa, whether by the criminals 
themselves or by third parties who act as couriers. Cash can be transferred 
physically in many ways, but during the workshop specific examples were cited 
where cash was strapped to bodies of passengers in motor vehicles and aircraft 
or hidden in their luggage.43 Similar methods are used to convey cash across the 
borders of South Africa. While it is legitimate to convey cash physically within 
South African borders, substantial cash amounts can only be transferred across 
South Africa's borders legally if the exchange control requirements have been 
met. 
Criminals launder illicit cash in many ways. As outlined earlier, luxury 
goods, vehicles and real estate may be bought. Trust accounts of professionals 
such as attorneys and estate agents are sometimes used to place the cash 
amounts in the financial system.44 Automatic teller machines and automatic 
vending machines selling cellphone products have also been used to place cash 
amounts. Laundering of cash also takes place in legal as well as illegal gambling 
institutions. In these cases, criminals or their assistants would often buy gambling 
chips or credits in cash. After a short period of gambling, the gambler would 
return and exchange the cash or credits for a cheque issued by the gaming 
institution.45 Slot machines in casinos have also proved vulnerable for abuse by 
launderers who used them successfully to launder bank notes that were stained 
by dye during cash heists. There is also evidence of laundering of cash at 
racecourses in South Africa. In some instances, the launderer would buy a 
winning ticket from a punter for a cash amount which would constitute a premium 
on the actual winnings for the seller. 
Some criminals also convert their South African cash into foreign currency. Such 
a conversion could be made to facilitate a payment that must be effected abroad, 
for instance to pay a foreign syndicate for a drug consignment, or to facilitate the 
investment of the proceeds abroad. Organised crime syndicates consisting of 
mainly foreign nationals often convert the currency to make it easier to spend 
their South African proceeds in their home countries. These syndicates often 
operate in American dollars and they also serve as a source of dollars on the 
black market for South African criminals who wish to convert their South African 
currency into dollars. Some syndicates also purchase international currency from 
tourists who are visiting South Africa. It appears as if some syndicates comprised 
of foreign nationals may be organising tour groups from their home countries to 
visit South Africa in order to obtain foreign currency. 
 
Abuse of financial institutions 
South Africa has a well-developed financial system.46 Products on offer vary from 
internet banking facilities47 and offshore unit trust investments to small savings 
accounts for a target audience comprised of people who are under-banked. 
Exchange controls have deterred the large-scale abuse of the financial system by 
international launderers. However, South African criminals are abusing the 
system in many different ways to launder and invest their ill-gotten gains. 
A sizeable amount of dirty money is still deposited into bank accounts.48 
Criminals sometimes deposit money into their own bank accounts, but more 
sophisticated criminals will often open accounts with false identification 
documentation or will open these in the names of front companies or trusts. 
There is also a trend towards using legitimate bank accounts of family members 
or third parties. An arrangement would be made with a family member who will 
allow the criminal to deposit and withdraw money from his or her account. In 
subsequent investigations, the family member will invariably plead ignorance of 
the true nature of the funds that were deposited.49 The first two convictions that 
were handed down for statutory money laundering in South Africa were based on 
such arrangements.50 
There is also evidence that more sophisticated criminals are using credit 
and debit card facilities to launder money and especially to move proceeds of 
crime across the borders of South Africa. Automatic teller machines are also 
used to deposit and withdraw money. Automatic teller machines that offer the 
facility to generate bank cheques have featured in particular laundering schemes. 
Bearer documents such as Negotiable Certificates of Deposit have also been 
employed in sophisticated schemes. 
Cases were also cited where insurance products were used to launder 
money. Single premium policies are bought with the proceeds of crime or the 
proceeds are used to pay monthly premiums. In some cases the launderer would 
make an overpayment and then ask for a repayment of the excess amount. 
When the company repays the excess amount the launderer represents the 
money as a payment in terms of an insurance product. In other cases the 
launderer would buy and surrender policies. There is a substantial market in 
second-hand policies in South Africa and this market is also vulnerable to abuse 
by launderers. 
 
The informal sector of the economy51 
The informal sector in South Africa represents an important part of the economy 
of the country.52 
According to Statistics South Africa's October Household Survey (2000), 
the `informal sector consists of those businesses which are unregistered, 
generally small in nature, and are seldom run from business premises, using 
instead homes, street pavements or other informal arrangements'. For purposes 
of this report the emphasis is placed on those participants53 in the informal sector 
of the economy that use legal means to reach legal ends, but which operate:  
 
-  in a largely unregulated environment (for instance hawkers), or 
 
- in a regulated environment where they do not comply with the formal laws 
and regulations that apply to the operation of such a business enterprise 
!for instance a licensed taxi operating company that does not keep formal 
financial records because the operator lacks the necessary skills, 
knowledge or interest to keep such records). 
 
Many, if not the majority of these businesses in the informal sector, can be 
described as survivalist and micro-enterprises. However, there are sizeable 
businesses that are often conducted informally, either because of a lack of formal 
business skills or a desire to remain outside the tax net.54 
Although these businesses operate informally, they do at times operate 
with the formal sector of the economy. An informal business may, for instance, 
have a formal contract with a supplier or a financial institution. Apart from the 
micro-lending industry, formal businesses are often reluctant to extend credit to 
informal businesses because of the high risk involved. The very nature of the 
informal sector makes it difficult to identify the client, verify its financial status and 
levy execution in case of default. Most of the informal sector business is therefore 
conducted on a cash basis or similar non-credit basis. 
The prevalence of informal business enterprises in South Africa, coupled 
with the general absence of formal financial and other business records, allows 
for the abuse of such enterprises by launderers.55They serve as convenient front 
businesses because it is difficult to dispute the business's alleged turnover in 
relation to its actual turnover. In fact, it is often impractical for formal sector 
businesses to attempt to verify business information furnished to them by informal 
sector businesses. 
Sizeable amounts of cash are also deposited into community-based 
rotating credit schemes that operate general savings schemes (eg stokvels), or 
dedicated savings schemes (eg burial societies).56 In the majority of these cases 
all the members will be known to one another. Every member will regularly 
deposit an agreed sum of money into a fund which is given, in whole or in part, to 
each member in rotation. Although the majority of schemes cannot be penetrated 
by a launderer,57 a launderer could operate a sham stokvel as a front to launder 
money.58 
Underground banking systems in the form of hawala/hundi systems are 
operating in South Africa within specific ethnic communities. These systems have 
apparently been used for many years to evade exchange control restrictions and 
expensive foreign exchange transaction fees. 
There are a number of other organisations, which operate on the outer 
fringes of the regulatory systems, that are also vulnerable to abuse as front 
businesses by launderers. These include NGOs, charitable institutions and 
churches. 
The abuse of the informal sector by launderers is a cause for concern. The 
laundering laws primarily regulate the formal sector of the economy. The extent 
of laundering in the informal economy cannot be estimated with any degree of 
certainty, but it is probably substantial. Arguments that laundered proceeds in the 
informal economy will be detected at the stage when such funds enter the formal 
sector of the economy do not sufficiently discount the nature of the informal 
sector of the economy. Proceeds can be placed, layered and integrated in the 
informal sector without entering the formal sector of the economy. If a launderer 
requires the proceeds to enter the formal sector, he can ensure that it does so at 
a stage when it has been laundered sufficiently and cannot be linked to unlawful 
activity anymore. 
 
General 
Many laundering schemes are too complicated to be planned and executed by 
the criminals themselves. There is clear evidence that knowledgeable persons do 
assist criminals to launder money. These persons often have legal, banking or 
tax expertise or general business acumen. For example, in the first case in which 
a conviction was handed down for statutory money laundering, 
S v Dustigar,59 an attorney and a police officer played key roles in planning and 
operating different laundering schemes. 
 
CASE STUDIES AND EXAMPLES 
Facilitators  
In S v Dustigar (Case no. CC6/2000, Durban and 
Coast Local Division, unreported) 19 persons were convicted for their 
involvement in the biggest armed robbery in South Africa's history. Nine of the 
accused were convicted as accessories after the fact on the strength of their 
involvement in the laundering of the proceeds and a tenth accused (Neethie 
Naidoo) was convicted on a count of statutory laundering under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 76 of 1996. Many of the accused were family members or third parties 
who allowed the abuse of their bank accounts to launder the money. In some 
cases they also allowed new accounts to be opened and fixed deposits to be 
made in their names to launder the money. 
Accused no. 9 (Nugalen Gopal Pillay) was a practising attorney. A robber 
who turned state witness testified that the accused approached him at the court. 
After confirming confidentially that the witness participated in the robbery, the 
accused said that he `must (then) have a lot of money'. Some time later he 
approached the witness and offered him an investment opportunity in a nightclub. 
The attorney then brokered the deal between the sellers and the witness. He 
drafted a sales agreement in which the name of the purchaser was left blank. He 
handed R500,000 in cash to the sellers at his office as a deposit in terms of the 
agreement. He drafted another sham agreement in the name of another pur- 
chaser and also manipulated his trust account records to hide the identity of the 
purchaser and the actual amounts that were paid. Accused no. 9 was sentenced 
to five years' imprisonment. The sentence can be converted into community 
service after at least one-sixth of the sentence has been served. 
Accused no. 13  (Balasoorain Naidoo) was a police captain who had 
served for 18 years in the South African Police Service. The judge described him 
as a highly intelligent person with business acumen. He created the laundering 
scheme that involved seven of the other accused: 
 
`Of all the accused who have been convicted as accessories, accused No. 
13's role was undoubtedly by far the most serious. He took upon himself 
the task of organising the so-called money laundering. He did so 
spontaneously and apparently with considerable vigour. He did so, 
furthermore, in enormous proportions. His ingenuity was limitless. In doing 
what he did he over-reached and manipulated not only police colleagues 
but also the women in his life who were under his influence, being accused 
Nos 15, 16 and 19.'  
 
Accused No. 13 was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. 
 
Spending patterns 
The following two cases afford examples of ostentatious spending by criminals. 
They do not represent criminal spending patterns in general, although the 
Asset Forfeiture Unit has encountered a number of similar cases. These cases 
do, however, highlight the types of goods that are often bought with ill-gotten 
gains. 
In 
Motsepe v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1997 2 SA 898 (CC) the CIR 
brought a sequestration order against the estate of Motsepe on the strength of a 
liquidated claim of R6.3m arising from tax assessments against him. Motsepe 
had been charged with drug offences, but escaped from custody and, when the 
judgment in the tax matter was handed down, he was still a fugitive from justice. 
In the papers before the court his estate was valued at R4.1m. His assets 
included 16 motor vehicles (eight Mercedes Benzes, four Toyotas, three 
Volkswagens and a 944 Turbo Porsche). He also held 16 personal bank 
accounts and over a period of two years amounts totalling R613,000 were 
deposited into these accounts. 
In S v Caswell (Case no. 27/87/98, Regional Court, Cape Town) the 
accused was convicted of theft of R8.9m from her employer and sentenced to ten 
years in prison. Evidence was led that, in a two- year period, she bought, 
amongst other things, two houses, two businesses, 13 luxury vehicles, five 
caravans, a motorbike, a ski-boat and a trailer.60 
 
Abuse of bank accounts of third parties 
In S v Van Zyl (Case no. 27/180/98, Regional Court, Cape Town) Van Zyl 
pleaded guilty to a charge of negligent laundering under s. 28 of the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 76 of 1996.He was the brother-in-law of Caswell who was convicted of 
theft of R8.9m from her employer (see above). He allowed her to make 79 
transfers of money totalling R7.6m from the account of her employer into his 
personal bank account. These moneys were channelled, on instructions by his 
sister-in-law, to her by means of cheques made out either to her or to people 
nominated by her. Some withdrawals were also made at ATMs. According to the 
accused, he was led to believe that the money was the result of successful 
business ventures of, and investments by, his sister-in-law. He acknowledged 
that his beliefs were unreasonable. He was sentenced to a ®ne of R10,000 and 
to imprisonment for ten years, suspended for five years.61 
 
Front businesses and registration of property in the names of other 
parties 
In Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Bathgate 2000 (1) 
SACR 105 (C) the Director sought a restraint order against the respondent who 
stood accused of drug dealing. 
The state estimated the value of the respondent's assets at R1.2m. The 
respondent was unemployed at the time of his arrest. The respondent alleged 
that he usually operated a flea-market stall, but, due to a lack of stock, he had 
been unable to trade for several months. His only income, according to the 
respondent, was R4,500 per month in the form of rentals from properties. He also 
alleged that he acquired R200,000 as gambling income. 
The respondent formed a close corporation, Bathgate Investments CC, in 
1995. He was the only member of the corporation. It had no bank account or 
income generating business but it did own two properties. The respondent owned 
a further two properties. In terms of a written agreement between the respondent 
and one Williams, one of the properties, as well as a vehicle, was registered in 
the name of Williams on condition that ownership would revert to the respondent 
upon notice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Van Zyl J commented as follows in his judgment (para. 21): 
 
`The respondent's close corporation, Bathgate Investments CC, is 
clearly a front for his criminal activities. There is no suggestion that it 
has any business activity of its own and likewise there is no 
indication of its having generated any income with which it acquired 
the real estate registered in its name. In the same way the 
respondent has made use of Gayle Williams for purposes of 
concealing certain of his assets, such as the Milnerton property and 
the vehicle purportedly registered in her name.' 
 
CONCLUSION 
This limited study provides a summary of expert opinions on the major money 
laundering trends in South Africa in 2001±02. The results of the study could serve 
as one of the basic benchmarks against which the efficacy as well as the impact 
of the money laundering control framework can be evaluated at a future date. 
There is evidence that POCA has already had a noticeable impact on laundering 
methods in practice. The more sophisticated criminals have started to adapt their 
laundering strategies to protect their assets from confiscation and forfeiture under 
POCA. Financial institutions with more vigorous anti-laundering policies have 
also recorded instances where potential clients were lost to institutions with less 
vigorous policies.  
The effect of laundering legislation on laundering practices in the country is 
set to increase substantially once FICA is fully implemented, the FIC is 
operational and the regulated institutions are compliant. However, the extent of 
the impact will depend on factors such as: 
The general level of awareness of the public of the law in this regard; 
 
- the level of compliance by business institutions and their 
employees with the laundering laws; 
 
- the effectiveness of the FIC; 
 
- regulatory action against institutions that fail to comply with their 
obligations; and 
 
- the prosecution and conviction of those who flaunt the law. 
 
There are positive indications that the South African money laundering control 
system will have an impact on current trends: important steps have already been 
taken by the South African government to ensure that the FIC can operate 
effectively and both government and the financial industry have committed 
themselves to combating money laundering. 
The study also provides an indication of major areas that require further 
attention. For instance, business enterprises such as companies, close 
corporations and trusts are being abused for laundering purposes. Attention will 
have to be given to measures that will safeguard these entities from abuse. 
Research should be undertaken to determine features that facilitate the abuse of 
such entities with a view to possible reform of the relevant legislation and 
regulatory structures. Attention should also be given to the possibility of 
regulating those service providers who assist in the incorporation of business 
entities and who sell shelf entities. Studies are furthermore required that will 
assist in determining the extent of money laundering in the economy. 
Considerable attention needs to be given to measurement issues in both the 
formal and informal sector. Such studies would not only assist in determining 
sensitive control measures that may be employed to counter laundering, but will 
also provide valuable insight into the general effects of laundering on macro- 
economic performance (ie growth, investment and job creation). 
During the workshop the hope was expressed that, in addition to more 
detailed studies of specific problematic areas, further studies on money 
laundering typologies and trends in South Africa will be under- taken in future. 
Such studies are required to develop a thorough understanding of money 
laundering methodologies in South Africa. However, it is also important to 
develop an understanding of money laundering methodology in the region and it 
is hoped that similar regional studies will be undertaken in the near future.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX A 
 
The following information was released by the South African Police Service: 63 
 
A comparison of the figures regarding the reports received for the period January 
1998 to December 1998 with the same period for the year 1999 reveals an 
increase of 81.67 per cent 
A comparison of the figures regarding the reports received for the period 
January 1999 to December 1999 to the same period for the year 2000 reveals an 
increase of 96.54 per cent. 
A comparison of the figures regarding the reports received for the period 
January 2000 to December 2000 to the same period for the year 2001 reveals an 
increase of 47.21 per cent. 
108 reports were ®led in January 2002 and 113 in February 2002. 
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